Visual Passwords Using Automatic Lip Reading by Hassanat, Ahmad Basheer
 International Journal of Sciences: 
Basic and Applied Research 
(IJSBAR) 
 
ISSN 2307-4531 
(Print & Online) 
 
http://gssrr.org/index.php?journal=JournalOfBasicAndApplied 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Visual Passwords Using Automatic Lip Reading 
Ahmad B. A. Hassanat* 
IT Department, Mu'tah University, Mu'tah – Karak, Jordan,  61710. 
hasanat@mutah.edu.jo 
 
Abstract 
This paper presents a visual passwords system to increase security. The system depends mainly on recognizing the speaker using 
the visual speech signal alone. The proposed scheme works in two stages: setting the visual password stage and the verification 
stage.  
At the setting stage the visual passwords system request the user to utter a selected password, a video recording of the user face is 
captured, and processed by a special words-based VSR system which extracts a sequence of feature vectors. In the verification 
stage, the same procedure is executed, the features will be sent to be compared with the stored visual password. 
The proposed scheme has been evaluated using a video database of 20 different speakers (10 females and 10 males), and 15 more 
males in another video database with different experiment sets. The evaluation has proved the system feasibility, with average 
error rate in the range of 7.63% to 20.51% at the worst tested scenario, and therefore, has potential to be a practical approach 
with the support of other conventional authentication methods such as the use of usernames and passwords.  
Keywords: speaker recognition; speaker authentication; lip reading; visual speech recognition; speech reading; VSR; visual 
feature extraction;, visual words; Behaviometrics; security.  
1. Introduction 
Identity theft is one of the fastest growing crimes in the world, it is estimated that 7.2 millions become identity theft and/or fraud 
victims in the last 13 years in the United States alone [1]. Electronic fund transfer-related identity theft was the most frequently 
reported type of identity theft bank fraud during calendar year 2008. The same reference stated that the annual fraud amount paid 
in the year 2008 was more than $1.8 billion in the USA alone. The methods of initial contact of those fraud complaints include 
52% by email, 11% by Internet websites and only 7% of those fraud complaints were through the phone as the initial point of 
contact. All these numbers came from claiming others identities using what they know, because what they know can be known 
by impostors using many methods. Current conventional authentication schemes are based only on “what you know?” such as 
usernames, passwords, PIN numbers, etc., all consisting of numbers, alphabetic letters and special characters. These approaches 
are vulnerable to a wide range of attacks including brute-force methods and phishing. 
Biometric-based authentication provides a stronger alternative since it is based on “who you are?” Such schemes include the use 
of fingerprint, iris and face authentication. The Visual passwords based authentication is a behavioral biometrics depends on 
recognizing the speaker using the visual signal alone. Unlike most biometrics the proposed scheme does not need special 
equipments (only a camera), and it is difficult to be deceived using a face image in front of the camera. 
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Sometimes people whisper to each other to prevent others from hearing them, and sometimes they do not even generate any 
Sound, and the other side has to understand what they meant using their faces visibility, visual cues and lip-reading. The visual 
passwords scheme tries to mimic this behavior by allowing the client to whisper the password to a secured system, without 
having the need to produce the audio signal, in order to increase security in such computerized and human-computer interaction 
systems. 
The visual password scheme processes visual signal feature, obtained from a video of the speaker while uttering a special 
sequence of words. This includes measuring some aspects of the lip movements and appearance, and finding a match between 
the spoken word(s) and the assigned password. Accordingly, the scheme grants or declines access to the secured system. A visual 
password is the visual side of a spoken word without incorporating the audio signal, so clients can provide their passwords by 
moving their lips without revealing the sound of the uttered word. This is beneficial, particularly to prevent others from hearing 
the password, and also work fine in noisy environment, where the audio signal become useless. Basically, the visual passwords 
scheme is a visual only speaker authentication. 
On the other hand we can't neglect the richer and more important speech information embedded in the audio signal (which is out 
of the scope of this study), as speech production is bimodal in nature, which is produced by the vibration of the vocal cord and 
the configuration of the vocal tract, including the nasal cavity, the tongue, teeth, velum, and lips [2]. This paper focuses on the 
visual side of speech only, particularly, when the audio signal is not generated or was noisy. 
The rest of this paper is devoted to review some of the related work, particularly our previous work [3] [4]   & [5] on which the 
visual passwords scheme is partially based, in addition to presenting the proposed scheme, and discussing the related 
experiments and their results.  
2. Related Work 
Most of the work done on speaker recognition was based on the audio signal alone, or on integrating the audio and visual signal, 
because the visual signal contains less information than the audio signal. Nonetheless facial visual cues can improve speech 
perception because the visual signal is correlated to the audio signal and contains complementary information to it [6] [7] [8] [9] 
& [10]. 
The first speaker recognition system using integrated acoustic and visual speech was proposed by Chibelushi and co-workers.  
For the acoustic features they used the Perceptual Linear Predictive (PLP) cepstral features to represent the vocal speaker 
characteristics. For the visual features they used a kinetic model of lip motion for extracting the characteristics of the changes in 
lip shape during speech. An artificial neural network (ANN) model was employed for the classification step. According to 
Chibelushi and his colleagues, the identification error rates were reduced to 1.25% using the integrated audio-visual recognition 
system [11]. 
Civanlar and Chen [12] used the mouth height and width as visual features, and the LPC coefficients as the audio features. Those 
features were combined to form the feature vector, and weighted depending on the acoustic noise. Dynamic time warping was 
used for recognition using a predefined threshold. The reported error rate for voice-only speaker verification was about 40% for 
noisy speech signal, compared to 5% for clean speech signal. The error rate for noisy signal was reduced to 10% using joint 
audiovisual verification. But for clean signal, incorporating the visual signal did not reduce the error significantly. 
Chaudhari and co-workers [13] proposed an audio-visual speaker identification and verification. The audio were represented by 
23 Mel-frequency cepstral coefficients (MFCC) and the visual parameters by 24 Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT) coefficients 
of the mouth region. Gaussian Mixture Models (GMMs) were used to model the speakers. The system was evaluated on the IBM 
ViaVoice database, the accuracy of their system using audio only was 95.5% increased to 99.5% after integrating the video 
signal. 
Faraj and Bigun [14] proposed an identity authentication technique by a synergetic use of lip-motion and speech, the lip-motion 
is defined as the distribution of apparent velocities in the movement of brightness patterns in an image. The audio features were 
extracted using the Mel-frequency cepstral coefficients (MFCC). Both audio and video information were fused to be recognized 
using GMMs. They evaluated their system using the XM2VTS database claiming a 98% recognition rate. Other researchers who 
worked on speaker recognition using AV speech information, include but not limited to [15] & [16]. 
Relatively very little work has been reported in the literature concerning the speaker recognition problem using the visual signal 
alone. This includes the work of Shiell and co-workers [17], who proposed a visual only system for speaker identification using 
Viola and Jones's method for face detection [18], active appearance model (AAM) [19] and DCT for visual features extraction. 
Hidden Markov models (HMM) was employed for classification. The system was evaluated using “VALID” database [20], their 
reported speaker identification rate was 59.3% 
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Cetingul and co-workers [21] proposed a quasi-automatic system to extract and analyze robust lip-motion features, the initial lip 
motion was represented using 2 approaches, 2D-DCT of the mouth region, and the other is tracking the lip’s boundaries over the 
video frames. An HMM-based identification system is used to compare the results of both approaches. The system was evaluated 
on the audio-visual database MVGL-AVD [22]. Average error rates (AER) for the first approach were in the range of (8.4-8.9%) 
depending on the size of the grid, and (8.4-11.2%) depending on the size of the shape feature vector, in both cases the best 
performance obtained with the largest size. A more in-depth review can be found in [23]. 
Shafait [24] proposed an algorithm to differentiate between a real person and a photograph using lip motion analysis. He 
recommend the use of 2D-DCT for feature extraction, the classifiers were either GMM or k-nearest neighbour (KNN), he 
evaluated his system using the "BioID" face database, reporting two recognition rates, 86% using the KNN, and 83% using 
GMM.    
Our previous work on automatic lip reading termed as visual words (VWords) [3] & [5] fits also in this category; this system 
provides a full automated solution for the visual (only) speech recognition (VSR) problem. The system (see Figure 1) consists of 
three major stages: detecting/localizing human faces [4], lip localization [25] and lip reading. 
 
Fig. 1. Automatic lip-reading system (Vwords). 
The first stages are discussed thoroughly in [4] & [25], the lip reading stage consists of 2 steps, feature extraction and word 
recognition. The following is the list of features, which are extracted from the sequences of the mouth area (region of interest 
(ROI)) during the uttering of a word (see Figure 3): 
1. The height (H) and width (W) of the mouth, i.e. ROI height and width (geometric-based features). 
2. The mutual information (M) between consecutive frames ROI in the discrete wavelet transform (DWT) domain (image-
transformed-based features based on temporal information). The mutual information M between two random variables X: DWT 
(current mouth) and Y: DWT (previous mouth) is defined by:  
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3. The image quality value (Q) of the current ROI with reference to its predecessor measured in the DWT domain (image-
transformed-based features based on temporal information). Image quality models image distortion as a combination of loss of 
correlation, luminance distortion, and contrast distortion. The quality measure Q is given by: 
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4. The ratio of vertical to horizontal features (R) taken from DWT of ROI (image-transformed-based features based on temporal 
information). The ratio (R) of the vertical features obtained from wavelet sub-band HL to the number of the horizontal ones 
gained from the LH is given by: 
H
V
R =               (3) 
Where V = number of vertical features, and H = number of horizontal features. It is well established that redundant data are 
located around the medians of the non-LL sub-bands, and detailed data are located further, accordingly, by substituting V and H 
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in equation 3, we get: 
 
5. The ratio of vertical edges to horizontal edges (ER) of ROI (image-transformed-based features). ER is obtained by using the 
Sobel edge detector [26] which is given by: 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 = ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ |𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝑥𝑥+𝑖𝑖 ,𝑦𝑦+𝑗𝑗 )(𝑆𝑆𝑣𝑣(𝑖𝑖+1,𝑗𝑗+1))|1𝑗𝑗=−11𝑖𝑖=−1𝐻𝐻𝑦𝑦𝑊𝑊𝑥𝑥
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ |𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝑥𝑥+𝑖𝑖 ,𝑦𝑦+𝑗𝑗 )(𝑆𝑆ℎ (𝑖𝑖+1,𝑗𝑗+1))|1𝑗𝑗=−11𝑖𝑖=−1𝐻𝐻𝑦𝑦𝑊𝑊𝑥𝑥                                          (5) 
6. The amount of red color (RC) in ROI as an indicator of the appearance of the tongue (image-appearance-based features). RC is 
the ratio of the red color to the size of ROI, this ratio can be calculated using the following equation: 
𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅 = ∑ ∑ 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟(𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦))𝐻𝐻𝑦𝑦=1𝑊𝑊𝑥𝑥=1 (𝑊𝑊)(𝐻𝐻)                                                              (6) 
7. The amount of visible teeth (T) in the ROI (image-appearance-based features). Detecting teeth in the ROI is a visual cue for 
uttering some phonemes and enriches the visual words signatures; the major characteristic that distinguishes teeth from other 
parts of the ROI is the low saturation and high intensity values [27]. By converting the pixels values of ROI to 1976 CIELAB 
color space (L*, a*, b*) and 1976 CIELUV color space (L*, u*, v*), the teeth pixel has a lower a* and u* value than other lip 
pixels [28]. A teeth pixel can be defined by: 
𝑡𝑡 = �1      𝑎𝑎∗ ≤ (𝜇𝜇𝑎𝑎 − 𝜎𝜎𝑎𝑎)1      𝑢𝑢∗ ≤ (𝜇𝜇𝑢𝑢 − 𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢)0              𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟                                                                            (7) 
The appearance of the teeth can be defined by the number of teeth pixels in ROI. Therefore, the amount of teeth in ROI is given 
by: 
𝑇𝑇 = ��𝑡𝑡(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦)                                                                                   (8)𝐻𝐻
𝑦𝑦=1
𝑊𝑊
𝑥𝑥=1  
The previous features were proven to be effective for automatic lip reading, so they will be used for the experiments conducted 
for this paper. In addition, this paper proposes adding an extra appearance-based feature to the features set as an attempt to 
increase accuracy; this feature comes from the Chi-square test, which is applied on the histogram of the current mouth image 
(observed values) and the histogram of the first mouth image (expected values). Ideally, the first image of the mouth (for each 
word's frame series) represents silence. Chi-square test reveals the amount of similarity between two variables, similarity 
between the current frame and the silence frame is affected by the changes of the mouth shape that occurs when uttering different 
phonemes, see figure (2). Chi-square test could be computed using equation 9. 
∑
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Where Oi is the frequency of intensity i in the observed mouth frame, and Ei is the frequency of intensity i in the first mouth 
frame.  If one or more of the expected values were zeros, those values are not computed. 
The previous equation yields large numbers, and the histogram values are affected by the size of the mouth, so it is better to use 
the probability of each color rather than the frequency using the following equation. 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
           
0.00 0.26 0.16 0.30 0.30 0.32 0.33 0.30 0.24 0.21 0.26 
12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 
           
0.26 0.26 0.26 0.28 0.31 0.27 0.20 0.28 0.31 0.33 0.72 
23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31   
      
   
  
0.60 0.50 0.70 0.84 0.88 1.18 1.04 0.36 0.57   
Fig. 2. The appearance of the mouth while uttering the word "zero", in addition to the values of the chi-square test below each frame. 
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Where w1 and h1 are width and height of observed mouth, w2 and h2 are width and height of the first mouth. 
 
Fig. 3. Visual words feature extraction and recognition method 
For the recognition step the KNN method is employed for two reasons. Firstly, the length of each word is different from person 
to another, and from time to time even those uttered by the same person, so interpolation is used to stretch the smaller signal to 
the larger one when comparing. Secondly, KNN is the simplest classifier and it is efficient when the training data is very small, 
and this is the case in this paper. Moreover, "the no free lunch theorem of optimization", suggests that there is no general-purpose 
universal optimization strategy [29], therefore, there is no need to try other classifiers, at least for the purpose of this paper. 
Unlike the state-of-the-art VSR approaches, which depend mainly on recognizing a visual speech unit called “Viseme” (the 
visual part of a phoneme), we developed a holistic approach to VSR that is based on visually recognizing words rather than their 
parts. This is done by analyzing several visual signals (see Figure 3) that can be associated with each word. Each of these signals 
represents the variation of a specific visual feature over the time, taken when the word is spoken. 
It turned out that the holistic approach preserves the speaker identity better than the visemic one. And we found that the VSR 
problem in general is a speaker dependent problem, and become more dependent when using the signature of the whole word as 
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the individual differences are preserved. This is also fostered by the use of appearance based features (such as RC, T and X), 
which also preserves the different appearance of the ROI, which different from one to another [3]. Therefore we used the visual 
words approach as the base for the visual passwords scheme. 
3. The visual passwords scheme 
The proposed scheme works in two stages: setting the visual password stage and the verification stage. At the setting stage the 
visual passwords system requests the user to utter a selected password consisting of a number of words, a video recording of the 
user face is captured, and processed by the discussed VSR system, which extracts a sequence of feature vectors, one for each 
word in the password. Each feature vector is represented by a matrix, each row of which represents a frame of the video, 
associated with the given word, representing some lip region measurements including width, height, mutual information between 
successive frames, image quality, horizontal/vertical features ratio, teeth, tongue appearance and chi-square test. The sequence of 
extracted matrices (feature vectors) is stored on the authentication server.  
In the verification stage, the same procedure is executed to extract the sequence of feature vectors, for the set of words uttered by 
the claimant when prompted, which would be sent in an encrypted form by the client to the authentication server. On receipt the 
server decrypt and compare with the stored visual password feature vectors. 
The main task of the “Visual Passwords” includes training a secure system on some examples of a particular Vword of a 
particular speaker, giving only their visual word signal; how is it possible to grant him/her access? And giving an unknown 
Vword how is it possible to decline him/her access? Those are the major research questions. 
The results from our previous work [3] show that VSR is a speaker-dependent problem, since the speaker-independent word 
recognition rate is about 32% on average, i.e. the word error rate is about 68% on average, which means that the same word 
spoken by two different speakers is more likely (68%) to produce two different signatures. This difference varies between 
people, and depends mainly on the individual differences between them, such as the way they speak (speech style and behavior), 
and the different appearance of the lips and mouth region.  
These individual differences form something like “visual speechprint”, which can be beneficial in applications such as the Visual 
passwords, which is the process of granting/declining access to a speaker who is speaking on the basis of their (unique to some 
extent) individual information embedded in their speech signal.  
Visual passwords (VPs), which can be generated using VWords, can be used as a backup for the normal string passwords, or as 
an alternative to face verification, as the latter can be faked by putting a fake image in front of a camera. For more security, 
visual passwords can be obtained for a system by asking the user to say a specific word several times. This word can be chosen 
by the user or provided by the system. Even if someone hacks into the string password, he will not be able to produce a visual 
word in the same manner that the client did, because of individual differences in mouth appearance, and the different way people 
speak and speak visually. Thus, the security of that system should be increased. 
The VPs problem can be thought of as a speaker verification problem, where the examples of only one speaker (client) is known 
previously, and the computer has to authenticate the speaker of a VWord approximately equal to one of those in the training set 
(system database). A specific threshold needs to be defined to approximate the test words, i.e. if the distance between the test 
word and the visual password is less than a threshold, then access to the system is granted, otherwise access to the system is 
declined. 
In other words, if the distance (D) of the nearest neighbor (NN) is less than the threshold (T), then the claimer is granted access 
to the system, otherwise, the claimer is given several tries to log in, and if he/she fails after n tries, he/she is considered an 
impostor, and the system will then block him/her (see Figure 4). In this work we used Euclidian distance and linear interpolation 
to compensate for the variation in the words lengths. 
To test the visual passwords scheme in this paper, 10 females and 10 males were randomly selected from an in-house video 
database, which is described in [3]. This database consists of 26 participants (10 females and 16 males) of different races and 
nationalities (Africans, Europeans, Asians and Middle-Eastern volunteers) an equal number of males and females is chosen to 
avoid gender bias, particularly, if we know that facial hair may affect accuracy of lip segmentation and feature extraction.  
Each participant recorded 2 videos (sessions 1 and 2) at different times. About half of the males have facial hair. The videos were 
recorded inside a normal room, each person in each recorded video utters non-contiguous 30 different words five times, which 
are numbers (from 0-9), short look-alike words (knife, light, kit, night, fight) and (fold, sold, hold, bold, cold), long words: 
(appreciate, university, determine, situation, practical) and five security related words (bomb, kill, run, gun, fire). 
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Fig. 4. The proposed visual passwords system. 
4. Experimental results 
There are 2 scenarios to be considered, the first being if the impostor knows the password and wants to produce it visually to 
access the system. And the other is when the impostor does not know the password and tries to say any word to access the 
system. 
Assuming that the client is one of the selected subjects and the rest are 19 impostors. The word “zero” spoken by subject 1 was 
assumed to be the visual password. To define the suitable threshold, the visual password “zero” (spoken by subject 1 from 
session 2, repeated 5 times) was used as a training set, while the test set was the “zeros” spoken by the rest of the subjects from 
session 1. After defining the threshold, the system was evaluated using a test set of the same subject, but this time from session 2 
instead of session 1, and the training set was the “zeros” spoken by the client (subject 1), but this time from session 1 instead of 
session 2, thus training the threshold in one session, and testing the method in the other session using the best threshold, see 
figure (5). This is done for each subject, as each subject is assumed each time to be the client and the rest are impostors. 
Thresholding 
 Speaker Session VWord 
Training set Subject 1 (Client) 2 Zero  
Test set All including the client  1 Zero  
Evaluation using threshold 
 Speaker Session VWord 
Training set Subject 1 (Client) 1 Zero  
Test set All including the client  2 Zero  
Fig. 5. The visual passwords' evaluation protocol (scenario 1). 
To find the best threshold which minimizes errors in the system, the visual password experiment was repeated 90 times, starting 
with threshold = 1, then increasing it by 0.1. There are 2 types of errors in such experiments, the false rejection error (FRE) and 
the false acceptance error (FAE). The FRE occurs when the system rejects the client considering him/her as an impostor, and the 
FAE occurs when the system accepts an impostor as a client. Both the false rejection ratio (FRR) and the false acceptance ratio 
(FAR) were recorded each time the threshold was increased (see Figure 6). The best threshold is the one where the total of FAR 
and FRR is minimized. 
 
Fig. 6. Example of threshold selection for the visual password “fourfive”, which was uttered by subject "Male02" in experiment DoubleVPunknown, the best 
AER (0.21%) achieved when threshold was 5.1. 
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We designed one experiment for each scenario, for the first scenario, assuming that the impostors know the password; the test set 
contains only the word “zero” spoken by 20 subjects. And the training set contains the word “zero” spoken by a client from the 
other session. The VP is a single word; we called this experiment (SingleVPknown).   
In the second scenario, assuming that the impostors do not know the password, the test set contains a non-zero VP, which is the 
word “one” in this paper,  which was spoken by 19 subjects (the impostors trying to log into the system), in addition to 5 
examples of the word “zero”, which was spoken by the client. The training set contains the word “zero” spoken by the client 
from the other session. This experiment is called (SingleVPunknown). 
In both experiments, the number of the tested words is 20 (subjects) x 5 (examples each word) = 100. And the number of the 
trained words is 5. both experiments were repeated 20 times (one for each speaker), each time the speaker being evaluated being 
considered as a client, by training his/her Vwords, and the other 19 speakers being considered as impostors, trying to get into the 
system by providing their Vwords. The results are shown in Table 1 and 2. 
It can be noticed from Table 1 and 2 the improvement in the performance of the visual passwords, particularly the reduction of 
the false acceptance error FAR when the VP is unknown to the impostors. Hence the new VP (that was used by the impostors to 
gain access to the system) has a different visual speechprint, so the probability to block them increased. In other hand, the FRR 
remained the same, because the word “zero” spoken by the client has not been changed. 
Table 1. Visual passwords results, using “zero=>zero” in "SingleVPknown", and "one=>zero" in "SingleVPunknown" as the visual passwords. 
  SingleVPknown SingleVPunknown 
Subject Threshold FRR FAR AER FRR FAR AER 
Female01 2 20% 7.53% 13.77% 20% 1.01% 10.51% 
Female02 3.7 0% 66.67% 33.34% 0% 25.25% 12.63% 
Female03 1.8 0% 0.42% 0.21% 0% 0.42% 0.21% 
Female04 2.9 20% 27.96% 23.98% 20% 2.02% 11.01% 
Female05 4.7 0% 96.77% 48.39% 0% 91.92% 45.96% 
Female06 1.4 0% 4.23% 2.12% 0% 0.00% 0.00% 
Female07 4.4 60% 76.34% 68.17% 60% 49.49% 54.75% 
Female08 2.7 0% 61.29% 30.65% 0% 33.33% 16.67% 
Female09 2.6 20% 12.90% 16.45% 20% 0.0303 0.11515 
Female10 1.7 0% 8.60% 4.30% 0% 0.00% 0.00% 
Average 12% 36.27% 24.14% 12.00% 20.65% 16.32% 
Male01 2.7 40% 37.63% 38.82% 40% 24.24% 32.12% 
Male02 2.7 80% 24.73% 52.37% 80% 26.26% 53.13% 
Male03 2.6 0% 16.13% 8.07% 0% 3.03% 1.52% 
Male04 2.1 0% 21.51% 10.76% 0% 12.12% 6.06% 
Male05 2.2 20% 22.58% 21.29% 20% 9.09% 14.55% 
Male06 2.5 0% 34.41% 17.21% 0% 17.82% 8.91% 
Male07 2.7 0% 27.96% 13.98% 0% 0.00% 0.00% 
Male08 2.6 40% 8.60% 24.30% 40% 0.00% 20.00% 
Male09 2 0% 3.23% 1.62% 0% 0.00% 0.00% 
Male10 1.6 0% 1.06% 0.53% 0% 0.00% 0.00% 
Average 18% 19.78% 18.89% 18.0% 9.3% 13.6% 
Overall average 15% 28.03% 21.51% 15.0% 15.0% 15.0% 
The performance of the proposed visual passwords system can be further improved by considering more than one visual word in 
the training set. This will increase the length of the visual password, and provide a stronger signal (complex password), which 
reduces the probability of being hacked. Using the same protocol as for the visual passwords experiments and the same 20 
subjects: for each speaker (client) all the possible combinations of the words “four” and “five” from session 1 have been 
concatenated to create a new signal, each word being repeated 5 times, so the number of concatenated words is 25 new signals 
(double Vwords), which is the size of the training set for each speaker, when evaluating each speaker as a client and the other 19 
speakers as impostors.  
Hence the data at hand is relatively small, it is useful to use the word concatenation, also the way of saying the word “A” might 
be different from the way of saying it next time, so mixing all these different ways of saying the word “A” with all these different 
ways of saying the word “B”, for instance, enriches the training set by covering more possibilities, in addition to a better 
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validation when using an affluent test set. 
For scenario 1, the test set contains all the possible combinations of the words (“four” and “five”) spoken by the rest of the 
speakers, in addition to all the possible combinations of the words (“four” and “five”) spoken by the client in session 2. This 
experiment is called (DoubleVPknown). 
For scenario 2, The test set contains all the possible combinations of 2 different words (the words “six” and “seven”) spoken by 
the rest of the speakers in addition to all the possible combinations of the words (“four” and “five”) spoken by the client in 
session 2. This experiment is called (DoubleVPunknown). The same previous evaluation protocol was used to find the best 
threshold (for each speaker), and to evaluate the system. Figure 7 depicts the performance of the system during the thresholding 
stage. In both experiments, the number of the tested examples is the square of (19 (subjects) x 5 (examples each word)) = 9025 
double VPs, in addition to 25 examples from the client. And the number of the trained examples is 25 double VPs. 
Both experiments were repeated 20 times (one for each speaker), each time the speaker being evaluated being considered as a 
client, and the other 19 speakers being considered as impostors. The results are shown in Tables 3 and 4. 
Table 2. Visual passwords results, using “zero=>zero” in "SingleVPknown", and "one=>zero" in "SingleVPunknown" as the visual passwords, adding the Chi-
square test feature. 
  SingleVPknown SingleVPunknown 
Subject Threshold FRR FAR AER FRR FAR AER 
Female01 2.8 20% 7.00% 13.50% 20% 0% 10.00% 
Female02 4.0 0% 59.00% 29.50% 0% 22% 11.05% 
Female03 1.9 0% 0.38% 0.19% 0% 0% 0.10% 
Female04 3.7 20% 22.75% 21.38% 20% 3% 11.50% 
Female05 5.7 20% 88.60% 54.30% 20% 83% 51.50% 
Female06 1.7 0% 6.00% 3.00% 0% 3% 1.50% 
Female07 4.6 40% 71.60% 55.80% 40% 40% 40.13% 
Female08 3.6 20% 56.80% 38.40% 20% 24% 22.20% 
Female09 3.1 0% 13.68% 6.84% 0% 2% 1.00% 
Female10 2.0 0% 5.50% 2.75% 0% 0% 0.00% 
Average 12% 33.13% 22.57% 12.00% 17.80% 14.90% 
Male01 3.3 40% 31.60% 35.80% 40.00% 18.77% 29.39% 
Male02 3.6 60% 26.80% 43.40% 60.00% 27.29% 43.65% 
Male03 2.8 0% 12.75% 6.38% 0.00% 4.65% 2.33% 
Male04 2.3 0% 22.29% 11.15% 0.00% 13.91% 6.96% 
Male05 2.4 20% 20.18% 20.09% 20.00% 7.54% 13.77% 
Male06 3.4 20% 35.32% 27.66% 20.00% 17.82% 18.91% 
Male07 3.0 0% 26.50% 13.25% 0.00% 0.30% 0.15% 
Male08 2.8 40% 9.40% 24.70% 40.00% 0.00% 20.00% 
Male09 2.7 0% 2.18% 1.09% 0.00% 1.00% 0.50% 
Male10 1.9 0% 2.22% 1.11% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Average 18% 18.92% 18.46% 18.0% 9.1% 13.6% 
Overall average 15% 26.03% 20.51% 15.0% 13.5% 14.2% 
 
Fig.7. Visual passwords system average error rates during the training stage adding the Chi-square test feature. FRR is a function of FAR. 
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It can be noticed from figure 7, Table 3 and 4 that the performance of the system has improved by using more than one word in 
the training set. The overall average error rate is dropped from 15.0% to 8.9% when the password is unknown and from 21.51% 
to 17.7% when the password is known by the impostors. Even when the password is known, the reported results (of these 
experiments) emphasis the efficiency of the proposed VP scheme; if the string password is known, in the conventional security 
systems it is guaranteed by 100% to log into the system. While in the proposed VP scheme even if the password is known still 
the probability to log into the system is less than 21.51% (depending on the strength of the VP). In addition, the accuracy of the 
system increased by more than 1% when using extra information such as the chi-square test. 
Despite speakers each having their own unique ways of speaking (visual and audio), they still have something in common (e.g. 
similar phonemes produce similar visemes) – allowing some people to defraud/trick the system to some extent (see Tables 1, 2, 3 
and 4). So, the more the client has a matchless, individual way of speaking visually and is consistent, the less chance there is of 
impostors defrauding his/her visual password (such as female03 and male03, and in contrast with female07 and male06).   
Male06 has other problems related to VSR, which include and not limited to the appearance of facial hair. Another problem that 
affects VSR systems, and therefore the proposed visual passwords system, is the visual speechless persons, who cannot produce 
a clear visual signal while speaking [3]. 
Table 3. Visual passwords system results using combination of two Vwords as a VP, “fourfive=>fourfive” in "DoubleVPknown", and “sixseven=>fourfive” in 
"DoubleVPunknown". 
  DoubleVPknown DoubleVPunknown 
Subject Threshold FRR FAR AER FRR FAR AER 
Female01 3.8 0% 29.42% 14.71% 0% 6% 3% 
Female02 6.1 28% 60.08% 44.04% 8% 27% 17% 
Female03 3.9 0% 0.42% 0.21% 0% 0.42% 0.21% 
Female04 4.1 0% 9.89% 4.95% 4% 3.78% 3.89% 
Female05 6 40% 58.74% 49.37% 4% 1.46% 2.73% 
Female06 3.6 2% 0.21% 1.11% 0% 1.00% 0.50% 
Female07 6.4 4% 71.40% 37.70% 4% 84.78% 44.39% 
Female08 4.4 0% 20.37% 10.19% 0% 4.54% 2.27% 
Female09 4.6 0% 23.46% 11.73% 0% 2.15% 1.08% 
Female10 3.6 3% 6.74% 4.76% 0% 0.26% 0.13% 
Average 7.68% 28.07% 17.88% 2.0% 13.1% 7.6% 
Male01 5.1 12% 6.79% 9.40% 4% 0.68% 2.34% 
Male02 5.1 0% 20.99% 10.50% 0% 0.42% 0.21% 
Male03 3.9 0% 19.14% 9.57% 0% 0.31% 0.16% 
Male04 3.8 12% 6.58% 9.29% 0% 1.28% 0.64% 
Male05 5 0% 20.99% 10.50% 28% 6.69% 17.35% 
Male06 4.6 64% 37.65% 50.83% 44% 16.94% 30.47% 
Male07 4.2 36% 11.52% 23.76% 24% 9.90% 16.95% 
Male08 6 8% 33.74% 20.87% 8% 27.01% 17.51% 
Male09 3.5 32% 5.35% 18.68% 20% 0.85% 10.43% 
Male10 3.8 12% 10.70% 11.35% 12% 0.48% 6.24% 
Average 17.6% 17.3% 17.5% 14.0% 6.5% 10.2% 
Overall average 12.6% 22.7% 17.7% 8.0% 9.8% 8.9% 
Relatively very little work has been reported in the literature concerning the speaker authentication problem using the visual 
signal alone. One example is the work of Shiell and co-workers [23], their system was evaluated using the “VALID” database, 
and the reported speaker identification rate was 59.3%. Since the proposed system uses a different database, with respect to 
system performance, we cannot claim that our system outperform the Shiell’s system. 
Results in table 5 show the importance and the power of the audio speech when added to the video speech. No doubt that the 
audio signal is very important when it comes to speech, but there are some problems such as background noise, particularly when 
providing such passwords in public noisy places, and the willing to reveal such a password loudly in public.   
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Table 4. Visual passwords system's results, using combination of two Vwords as a VP, “fourfive=>fourfive” in "DoubleVPknown", and “sixseven=>fourfive” in 
"DoubleVPunknown", adding Chi-square test feature. 
  DoubleVPknown DoubleVPunknown 
Subject Threshold FRR FAR AER FRR FAR AER 
Female01 4.3 0.00% 25.38% 12.69% 0.00% 5.00% 2.50% 
Female02 7.1 24.00% 57.14% 40.57% 4.00% 27.65% 15.83% 
Female03 4.7 0.00% 1.20% 0.60% 0.00% 1.20% 0.60% 
Female04 4.7 0.00% 8.00% 4.00% 2.00% 2.00% 2.00% 
Female05 6.8 36.00% 55.70% 45.85% 4.00% 0.94% 2.47% 
Female06 4.3 2.00% 0.98% 1.49% 0.00% 2.09% 1.05% 
Female07 6.8 4.00% 67.59% 35.80% 4.00% 74.54% 39.27% 
Female08 5.3 2.00% 16.62% 9.31% 0.00% 3.25% 1.63% 
Female09 5.8 0.00% 20.36% 10.18% 0.00% 0.37% 0.19% 
Female10 4.1 2.00% 4.50% 3.25% 0.00% 0.10% 0.05% 
Average 7.00% 25.75% 16.37% 1.40% 11.71% 6.56% 
Male01 6.3 8.00% 3.16% 5.58% 2.00% 0.35% 1.18% 
Male02 6.2 0.00% 16.96% 8.48% 0.00% 0.20% 0.10% 
Male03 4.7 0.00% 15.47% 7.74% 2.00% 0.60% 1.30% 
Male04 5.0 12.00% 4.70% 8.35% 0.00% 3.00% 1.50% 
Male05 5.5 0.00% 18.30% 9.15% 24.00% 7.70% 15.85% 
Male06 5.7 56.00% 33.50% 44.75% 38.00% 11.54% 24.77% 
Male07 4.7 28.00% 7.26% 17.63% 24.00% 7.18% 15.59% 
Male08 6.3 8.00% 30.35% 19.18% 8.00% 24.00% 16.00% 
Male09 4.2 28.00% 2.00% 15.00% 12.00% 1.33% 6.67% 
Male10 5.1 8.00% 8.40% 8.20% 8.00% 0.10% 4.05% 
Average 14.80% 14.01% 14.41% 11.80% 5.60% 8.70% 
Overall average 10.90% 19.88% 15.39% 6.60% 8.66% 7.63% 
Table 5. Speaker authentication results, accuracy comparison of some methods.  
Work Audio Video Audio/Video 
Chibelushi and co-workers [11] 93.75% 87.5% 98.75% 
Civanlar and Chen [12] 60% noisy speech 95% clean speech 
- 
- 
90% noisy speech 
95% clean speech 
Chaudhari and co-workers [13] 95.5% - 99.5% 
Faraj and Bigun [14] - - 98% 
Shiell and co-workers [17] - 59.3% - 
Cetingul and co-workers [21] - 91.1% - 91.6% 88.8% - 91.6%  - 
Shafait [24] - 83% GMM 86% KNN - 
Hassanat [3] - 
72% single VP 
92% double VP  
small database 
- 
The proposed work - 
79.5%-SingleVPknown 
85.8%-SingleVPunknown  
84.6%-DoubleVPknown 
92.4%-DoubleVPunknown 
- 
Whispering the visual password is desirable, since no one want people around to hear their password. From the previous 
experiments, it is not clear whether the resultant lip motions will be the same as in the case where the sound is revealed. There is 
a feeling that the air blow may have an alteration on the shape of the lips. Therefore, another experiment is conducted to evaluate 
the system when uttering the visual passwords without the sound. 
This experiment conducted using 15 male students from the IT department in Mutah University, each participant was asked to 
utter his first name 5 times in 2 different sessions. Students’ names were different from each others. The “SingleVPunknown” 
experiment is used on those data, session 1 is used for training thresholds, and session 2 for testing (see table 6 for the results). 
It can be noticed from table 6 (the normal column) that the results of applying the system on a second database support the 
results obtained from the first database in table 1, and 2. Also it is clear to see the affect of the blown air on the accuracy, the 
louder the word is spoken, the more blown air, which enhances the shape of lips, and make it better for recognition, and vice 
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versa. When no voice is provided the user need to be a good actor to produce a good visual signal, this is the case of subject 5. In 
such work personal ability to provide signal is a major concern. 
Table 6. Average error rates resulted from experiment “SingleVPunknown” on the second database, adding Chi-square feature.  
subject vpassword Threshold Normal Whisper Mute 
1 Ibrahim 4.1 23% 49% 92% 
2 Audai 3.6 35% 59% 84% 
3 Nahar 2.8 12% 26% 31% 
4 Firas 2.3 30% 35% 42% 
5 Mohammad 5.3 10% 12% 8% 
6 AbdelRuhman 6.1 1% 19% 35% 
7 Ahmad 3.1 20% 60% 81% 
8 Hussam 4.7 19% 49% 71% 
9 Mutasim 3.9 8% 22% 19% 
10 Omar 1.9 13% 30% 61% 
11 Osamah 3.4 12% 29% 32% 
12 Ali 1.7 17% 33% 48% 
13 Loai 2.2 43% 59% 65% 
14 Thamir 3.6 9% 21% 28% 
15 Abubakir 5.1 3% 15% 18% 
Average 17% 34% 49% 
Generally, if a user wants to provide their visual password mutely, it is their responsibility to do it right and consistent, in this 
context it is not necessary to say a real word, as the user needs to move their lips in a specific way, and to memorize this way to 
be used to login next time, but this seems to be a hard task for most people. 
Time complexity analysis for the proposed system 
The total consumed time includes the different stages of the system which are: 
Finding the face consumes O(n2) in one frame; where n is the width and height of each frame. For the whole word it consumes 
O(Ln2), where L is the number of frames for each word.  Lip localization also consumes O(Ln2) for each word. 
Feature extraction methods has different time complexity depending on each feature, those methods work only on the ROI, 
which is the mouth area, the size of this area is very small comparing to the size of the face, therefore we assume the mouth 
width and height equal to a constant k. 
Finding the height and width of ROI consumes O(2Lk) for both. Computing M costs O(Lk2). Computing Q costs O(Lk2). 
Computing R costs O(Lk2) for wavelet coefficients, O(Lk2/4) for HL sub band, and,  O(Lk2/4) for LH sub band. 
Computing ER costs O(9Lk2) for vertical edges, and O(9Lk2) for the horizontal edges, where 9 is the filter size. Computing RC 
costs O(Lk2). Computing T costs O(Lk2). Computing Chi-square costs O(256Lk2). 
Computing KNN costs O(9Lm), where 9 is the number of features, and m is the number of samples.  Accordingly, the system 
total time complexity is defined by: 
T(n)= O(Ln2) + O(Ln2) + O(2Lk) + 5 O(Lk2) +2 O(Lk2/4) + 2 O(9Lk2) + O(256Lk2) + O(9Lm)       (11) 
The number of frames L is in the range of 30 to 60 frames per word. So it can be considered as a constant number. The number 
of samples depends on the number of subjects in the system so it must be a variable, and it can be approximated to n, 
accordingly, equation (11) can be approximated to: 
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T(n) = O(kn2) +  O(km)          (12) 
As a result, time complexity will be quadratic if the size of the frame is greater than the number of samples, and it will be linear 
if the dimensions of the frame are both small constant numbers. This is the case when motion detection is used, and then the 
mouth area is the only used part of the frame. 
5. Conclusion and future work 
The visual passwords scheme, which can be thought of as a speaker authentication system using the visual signal alone, was 
proposed to increase security and reduce identity theft. It is shown in this paper that people with different appearance and unique 
way of speech visually can produce their passwords using their lips even without having the need for the audio signal, which 
cannot be produced in some circumstances (acoustic noise). Several experiments were conducted to test the visual passwords 
system, attaining excellent performance even when the password is known by the imposters. The performance of the proposed 
visual passwords system can be improved by considering passwords consisting of more than one word. This increases the length 
of the visual password, and provides a stronger signal, which reduces the probability of being hacked. And therefore, has 
potential to be a practical approach. 
Implementing this work alone isn't provably stronger than many other types of authentication (biometrics), and is just as subject 
to spoofing/replay attacks as many other forms of authentication. To strengthen the overall authentication system and to avoid 
replay attacks, the proposed system may make use of session tokens, time stamping or ask the user to provide a part of the visual 
passwords. For example, the server asks the user to provide the first and the third visual passwords, so a hacker will not get the 
whole password, and each time the server ask for a different sequence of the visual passwords. 
Iris recognition is more accurate than the proposed method, but it needs special equipments. Face recognition might be more 
accurate as well, but it is easy to trick the system using a picture of the client, audio speech and audio/video speech recognition is 
also better, but it is affected by the background noise.  
The performance of the visual passwords system might be further improved by combining other biometric factors, such as face 
authentication or even combining or fusing a PIN number, or the string password with the visual word signature. The fusion can 
be done by concatenating the feature vectors, score-based fusion, or as a decision-based fusing. All these improvements will be 
investigated in future work. 
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